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'ARAFAT MESSAGE TO SYRIAN PALESTINE SEMINAR

NC040947 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 0530 GMT 4 Mar 82

[Text] Brother Commander Abu 'Ammar [Yasar 'Arafat] addressed a message to the seminar held by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party [SSNP] yesterday on the Palestinian issue. The text of the message, which was read at the seminar, follows:

Brother Chairman of the exalted March seminar, brother and sister participants: [revolutionary greeting]. It gives me pleasure on my own behalf and on behalf of the brother members of the PLO Executive Committee to address this message to your seminar, held on the occasion of the SSNP golden jubilee, to congratulate the SSNP leader, command and members on the occasion and to express the hope that the important ideological and political activities of your seminar will succeed--the seminar that will deal with the subject of Palestine between liquidation and liberation.

Your seminar is being held in conditions in which the U.S. imperialist and Zionist enemy conspiracies are increasing in order to liquidate the Palestinian issue. The Lebanese and Palestinian peoples are today suffering from the effect of these conspiracies. They are also facing the modern U.S.-Israeli military machine, which has turned the south [of Lebanon] into a testing ground, just as it did in Vietnam. But the will of steadfastness and defiance shown by the brave Lebanese-Palestinian masses is the best example of the greatness of these masses and of their sacrifices. These same masses have given examples of confrontation, steadfastness and perseverance despite continuous aggression and intensive conspiracies.

Brothers and sisters: Your seminar is being held as the Palestinian people's struggle and revolution are escalating. It is sufficient to notice this blessed upsurge that has been continuing for months in the West Bank and Gaza, the heroic armed struggle that is being waged by our heroes in the occupied territories and the youthful strength represented by our joint Lebanese-Palestinian forces on the steadfast land of southern Lebanon while hotly and triumphantly confronting the Zionist enemy and its tools inside and outside the border zone.

The picture of this liberation line is complete when we place it beside the heroic stand of our brother people and their nationalist forces fighting in Lebanon in defense of the national issue, foremost being the Palestinian issue and revolution, and firmly and clearly confronting the conspiracies of U.S. imperialism and its agents. At the same time, our people in proud Golan are waging an open battle against the Zionist enemy who thinks it can swallow up the Golan, relying on U.S. imperialism which protects it from punishment by international society. The question of the thousands of the sons of the Golan is choking it and forcing it to reveal the criminal plots it was hiding--plots that were directed against the sons of the entire area and against our nation's future, fate and civilization.

It is one battle and one trench. Its result is clear and its triumph is for our Arab nation's peoples in view of their sacrifices and struggles and in view of the support and backing we are getting from all our allies and friends and from all the free men and honorable people in the world.

Today, more than at any time in the past, we are urged to raise the consciousness of our masses; we are also urged to increase the cohesion of our ranks and to gather our Arab forces in all the military, economic, political and popular spheres to face this savage onslaught to which our Arab nation's existence and civilization are being exposed. However, it is a painful labor for the great birth of this new dawn. Victory is certainly coming.

Finally, I repeat my congratulations on the occasion of the seminar and wish it success. It is a revolution until victory.

CSO: 4404/331

ISLAMIC FAITH IN THE MAGHREB ANALYZED

Casablanca LAMALIF in French No 132, Jan-Feb 82 pp 8-16

[Article by Mohamed Gibril: "Islam Today in the Maghreb"]

[Text] How do the people of the Maghreb today practice islam? What are the various representations and formulations of it among them in terms of the "din" and "dunya"-- faith, law, social ethics and basic culture? How have the crises in the North African societies and the disappointments which followed their modern experiments just after independence was won been reflected variously in a new return to religion and the traditional practices?

What is the government policy in this connection and what is the relationship between the schisms dividing these societies and the various references to the religious dimension?

In an often very close-knit work which came out recently under the title "The Moslem Maghreb in 1979,"¹ compiled under the supervision of Christiane Souriau, intellectuals from the Maghreb and Europe, each using his own approach, update the current situation.

Whether it be a matter of the relationship between the government and orthodox authorities, the role of the "ulama," the living force of popular traditions, a return to the saints, if not to magic, or the status of women or the actions of Moslem organizations, this collective effort provides us with an opportunity to compare the situations in Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Libya. These are situations which, as Paul Pascon notes in conclusion, perhaps feature something new in that the Maghreb "is now seeking within and on the basis of itself," even if no creative project has yet been seen.

It is not a question here of finding ready-made answers or miraculous interpretations. The main thing is first of all to cease to neglect or to conceal a multiple reality which is not susceptible to alteration either by taboos or prejudgments.

The renewed importance taken on by the invocation of islam in the countries of the Maghreb has rather widely different situations as its context.

In Tunisia, the period just after independence was won was characterized by faithfulness to the reformist project of Khair ed-Din (1822-1899), to which the Bourguiba regime would give breadth, with the procedures remaining very much the same. A. Zghal, the Tunisian sociologist, points out that for Khair ed-Din as for Bourguiba it was a matter of deriving lessons from the objective situation of dependence in

which Tunisia in fact found itself in relation to Europe, a situation which constantly threatened the independence of the country. The way of salvation in their view involves strengthening the national state by adopting the sciences and institutions of that era, and in order to do so they had to neutralize the religious clergy by integrating them in this project, which they set forth as the means best suited to safeguarding Islam. Civil society lent itself very readily to such an undertaking, in view of its urban traditions (Tunis being, as it always had, the center, the main focus of political life) and its impregnation with Mediterranean culture, despite its attachment to Islam and the Arab language (Tunisia being more homogeneous on the linguistic level than the other countries in the Maghreb, since Berber is only spoken by a very small proportion of the population). If the same differentiations opposing the state and civil society, the city dwellers and the peasants, the rich and the poor, men and women, the traditional elite and those trained in Europe, have remained since the days of Khair ed-Din, the fact nonetheless remains that the innovation under the Bourguiba regime was the implementation of what in the era of Khair ed-Din remained a project which could not be achieved, because of the traditional burdens and hindrances imposed by France, among other factors. The institutionalization of this reformist ideology, given the fervor of triumphant nationalism, polarized the political and social life of the country, such that henceforth, other discussions of a lay or religious nature would be defined in relation to it. Thanks to the consensus to which it led, the Bourguiba regime could guarantee the neutrality of the clergy by integrating Zaytuna University within the modern educational network, wherein it became a simple faculty of theology from which the leading graduates of the first classes were absorbed by the state administrations. Along the way, Bourguiba succeeded in imposing profound reform in the field of the status of women (reform which has remained to this day the boldest ever carried out in the Arab world). He also unified the court system after integrating in it the cadres produced by Zaytuna University, and he took steps which seem extremely bold today, such as lifting the Ramadan fasting requirement. To implement his project, the regime chose the single-party system and the most limiting form of state centralism. Thus for historical reasons, the trend toward a certain secularization of society was very clear in Tunisia. This, to a certain extent, explains the equal clarity of the return to Islam, which is without a doubt the strongest at the present time of all the similar movements in North Africa.

Religious Affiliation and Secularism

The situation in Algeria was different just after independence was won. The popular tradition has remained very strong, and Islam was the main gilt-edged security against colonial domination and the collapse of the old community structures. The national state which claims to be "revolutionary" in many respects can rely on the conservative environment in social affairs, a conservatism which is indeed linked with religion. It was for this reason that the clarity of the status and place of women has always remained well defined, even prior to the emergence of the pro-Islam groups in recent years.

The Algerian state as Henri Sanson describes it is both religion-affiliated and secular, reflecting the image of the society. It is religiously affiliated because the Algerian people are Moslem (the constitution proclaims that "Islam is the religion of the state"). The state guarantees the observance of basic religious practices² and the Malikite rite (in the courts). The state is secular within its religious affiliation and not in opposition to it, reflecting thereby the society which, by virtue of its Malikite Sunnism, confers no privileged religious status on any of

its members, all believers being equal in law (the ulama, the imams, etc are not a clergy with priestly authority, since religious authority is granted to individuals by the community and not by an established hierarchy).

The state is secular in the sense that it has no religious authority, since its power in this field "can only be in terms of service." Islam, without an intercessor, reigns, while Moslem laymen (whether they be ulama or state officials) govern. To be sure, this does not mean that religion is not also subject, both in the state and in society, to ideological concerns.

Thus the official text describes Islam as a "basic component" as it does socialism. The state claims to be Islamic and socialist, purposely bringing the two levels closer together. "The revolution fits well within the context of the historic perspective of Islam," and in urging "social revolution" and "the total reorganization of society." There are both links and distinctions, since Islam reigns in a religious sense, and the revolution reigns in politics.

In state practice, we should note control over the "habus" (there are no longer any free habu assets or free mosques, since they all come under state jurisdiction). Similarly, there is no longer any unaffiliated traditional education (the free medersas of the ulama were incorporated in national education, as the various levels of religious teaching have been).

However, the Algerian state has never had any secularizing inclination of the Tunisian sort. State control does not seek to change accepted practices and rules, but is accompanied by respect for the status quo. For if, as Suad Khodza notes, the changes due to industrialization, urban development and education profoundly alter the structures of society and if the deterioration of the patriarchal family and the old power relations reveal a "crisis of legitimacy" in the traditional society, its profound influence has not by any means yielded (it is not irrelevant to stress here that the liberation war in part reestablished the legitimacy of tradition, which has retained an enduring effect in the course of the construction of the new state and the reclassification within society).

Hegemonism and Legitimacy

These are the problems born of the options selected by the regime which will bring to the forefront the invocation of religion or traditional values (the latter within different perspectives, depending on whether we are speaking of adherents of Islam or those of popular culture, the Kabyles and others). The state, very cautious when it comes to tradition, must henceforth deal with a more or less latent opposition which will provide a challenge on its own terrain, but in the name of religion.

In Morocco, the situation seems still more ambiguous and it also has a number of specific characteristics. For historic reasons, the system has remained characterized by a religious tradition which, as Remy Leveau writes, "has in the course of the centuries been closer to puritanism and doctrinal strictness than the religious liberalism of the Ottoman Empire" (which serves to define the particular heritage of Morocco and differentiates it from that of Tunisia, for example). The legitimacy conferred by religion is a basic given, since the monarch is simultaneously chief of state and commander of the believers. If there is a hierarchy in the religious sector in which the regime plays a central role, this sector is not, however, homogenized. Mohamed Tozy shows that the regime plays the role of a hegemonic author

dictating what role will be played in the political-religious field by the other actors, political parties, ulama, brotherhoods and religious associations, unions and major political families.³ Thus the religious dimension is invoked to a greater extent by the Moroccan state than the others in North Africa, and it has to do with an affiliation and historic tradition which are regarded as the foundations of legitimacy.

Tensions and Liberalization

But it is nonetheless in Morocco that we see a diversity of practices, organizations and discussions having to do with religion and the political-religious realm. Is it this central legitimacy given the system through the invocation of the religious aspect and the existence, even if under strict control, of this diversity which lead to what R. Leveau calls the "rather positive balance for the regime" in relation to the situation created by the development of the pro-Islam trend? For in Morocco, "the upsets suffered by society have been much less profound than those in Algeria or in Iran,"⁴ and the regime has never had to do battle with "official Islam" (in this case, the ulama). Tradition is structured on the state level as a central value more than elsewhere in North Africa, but paradoxically, as Leveau notes, the state is little involved in the regulation of the social behavior of individuals (except when it comes to the observance of Ramadan) and "the result is a real liberalization of daily life which is more pronounced than in Algeria."

It is obvious that it is on other levels, because of the profound schisms dividing society, that formidable pressures and influences weigh upon individuals, making this apparent "liberalization" singularly relative. It is also the tensions resulting from the social development investing the political-religious challenge with its potential which, although they cannot be compared with what is happening in Tunisia, cannot be overlooked.

However, the hierarchic structure in the political-religious realm does not entail centralization alone but also a mechanism of balancing and arbitration having to do with the consensus concerning tradition and, depending on the situation, leaving a broader or narrower margin for the other components, to the benefit of the basic status quo. The "religious" advantage of the Islamic faction might as a result be hindered, which would mean that its challenge must be more open and "political" (this does not seem to be entirely the case, which also reveals the difference from the Tunisian situation, where religious criticism of secularization suffices to provide a basis for political challenge of the regime).

Reactivation of Tradition

Within these general contexts, what is the actual experience of Islam in the societies of the Maghreb?

It reflects the crisis and the disappointments of the first national experiments just after independence was won, and it also reflects the specific weight (ill understood, in most cases) of the traditional practices and the new forms they are taking. For Tunisia (but this might be generalized roughly for all of North Africa), A. Zghal distinguishes three forms in which tradition was reactivated toward the end of the 1960's and early 1970's, in response to different social demands:

In peasant circles, there is increasing recourse to the marabouts and witch doctors;

The ulama and Salafist notables want to play a social role, in view of the deepening of the crisis (in Tunisia, "they are seeking their revenge against the Westernized intellectuals who had eliminated them from the political and social scene");

The pro-Islam movements, which represent the real novelty, are gaining ground, particularly among the university and secondary school students and the young people in the popular sectors.

This is the more remarkable in Tunisia since, according to Y. Ben Achour, when Bourguiba took action against the Zaytuna circles (the ulama), there was no really hostile popular reaction to this policy (there was one isolated protest demonstration in 1961 against the dismissal of an imam in Kairouan). According to this author, there was in Tunisia "a collective attitude of neglect, of devaluation and social deterioration of which the religious system was the focus. It had become a synonym of all that was archaic, since all of its mechanisms had broken down and it no longer enjoyed any prestige in the eyes of the public and thus was attractive to no one." Moreover, this discrediting of the Zaytuna had begun well before the steps taken by Bourguiba, because its crisis was already very clear before independence was won. The integration of the Zaytuna professors in the mechanisms of the new state and their acceptance of a more open approach to modern knowledge were thus a logical consequence of this development. There were very few of them who remained faithful to the old school alone and very, very few who retained the turban, the costume, the titles and functions of the "ilm-shaikhs," and had at the same time acquired Western university training, as a result of which they were given the strange name "Zaytuni-Sorbonni" (references to Zaytuna and the Sorbonne).

Retreat and Refuge

Did this devaluation of the old system mean a secularization of society or the discrediting of its religious aspect?

The members of the young pro-Islam movement focus their criticisms on precisely this point today. According to a survey of pro-Islam women by Souhayr Belhassen, no religious education was given to the children in any of the families of the individuals interviewed (this was also what "struck" Bruno Etienne in Casablanca—the disappearance of widespread education in the Koran and religious apprenticeship, and the limited family absorption). Thus in the view of S. Belhassen, one can say that the basic type of education in Tunisia is relatively secular. "I never ceased to question my parents about the Moslem religion, but no one could answer me," one worker said. The daughter of a day laborer reported that "in our house, prayer was something obsolete. I was ashamed of praying, and did it in secret." Another young woman interviewed said the following:

"I asked my mother why women wore the veil. She told me not to concern myself with these old wives' tales and to do my chores instead of wasting time in prayer."

But what might the extent of this devaluation have been? And in what circles was it in fact evidenced? Are these criticisms as pursued by the pro-Islam militants exaggerating the case a bit?

Whatever the extent of the dizzying spiral of the pro-Islam movement in Tunisia, and the breadth of its impact, which seems to be more clearly evident than in the other North African countries, is it related to the relative retreat of tradition

and the total elimination of the practices of the marabouts and the brotherhoods? To judge from the works covered by the CRESM effort, it is clear that the weight of tradition has remained much more of a factor in Algeria and above all in Morocco, with a capacity to adapt to the new conditions and demands born of the societal crisis.

In Algeria, Islam represented a central gilt-edged security during the colonial period, "a last unifying rampart, a desire for salvation so strong and real that it made it possible to surmount the obstacles to decolonization one by one" (M. K. Bouguerra). The complex of problems in the modern era were not seen at that time as they were after independence was won. In the past, all of society acted as a block, building on tradition with a view to opposing the colonizing society, which derived benefit only from modern aspects. After independence was won, opening up in principle access to "modern" well-being to all, developments were characterized both by schisms and the resistance of tradition. Mohamed Arkoun (quoted by Y. Fekkar), describes this as a "tradition-regression, in which intermingled beliefs were to be found, with animism, magic, superstition and the cult of the saints not representing vestiges but constituent parts of a whole called Islam." The weight of the patriarchy is still considerable, as the status and condition of women bear witness.

The Example of the Abadite Mزاب

However, resistance does not mean inertia: it all seems as if the greater part of society, in view of the changes brought about by these policies and economic development, kept in reserve its own rhythm of development (leading it to assimilate or reject new developments).

Two examples here are revealing. The first has to do with a micro-society within Algerian society, that of the Abadite Mزاب, in which the traditions were among the most rigorous. The second has to do with the current marabout practices in as modern a city as Casablanca.

In the view of Simane Chikh, who studied the Abadite society⁵ of the Mزاب, the main factor in its cohesion is its attachment to religion and to a jealously preserved rite. Sobriety, strictness and piety are the typical characteristics of this society, and their mark is seen in the special architecture of its cities in the Sahara. This Berber-speaking society which also has solid mastery of Arabic (which remains the vehicle not only of religious practice but also literary expression) is confined by a very strict code regulating the smallest detail of conduct and imperatively imposed upon individuals who are bound to observe "walaya" (the communion of solidarity) and over whom the threat of "bara'a" (excommunication) hangs. Those in this society live in a closed universe, in which conservatism rejects any "bid'a" (reprehensible innovation) and encourages the timeless repetition of the same gestures (Chikh says that among the Mزاب, one witnesses a veritable "mania for purity," which leads to a "phobia about defilement"). Women are in practice the hostages of this society. They are forbidden to travel outside the Mزاب region and their role is to serve as the guardians of tradition.

The Essential and the Secondary

However, the development of the oil sector has led to considerable commercial activity in the region and the development of an industrial zone is tending to transform the social landscape and to bring the people of the Mزاب out of their age-old isolation

(there has been an influx of manpower from the northern part of the country, whereas previously the migration was above all from the Mزاب region toward the north). Earlier, the towns in the Mزاب region were for all practical purposes inhabited only by women and the aged, since the majority of the men emigrated and only returned at long intervals. The development commerce made it possible for the men to settle in their native area, and this led to a rapid development in customs. Since the women are traveling more to other regions, girls are receiving schooling and television has been introduced, the women are no longer completely ignorant about the outer world. Those who support the ultrarigid conservatism, if their strength is waning, manifest their opposition nonetheless. However, between them and the advocates of a liberalization of customs in a more permissive direction, there has developed, particularly in the town of Beni Isquen, a more moderate trend represented by the azzaba (religious dignitaries responsible for the administration of the mosque and religious affairs), who are aware of the development which has occurred and want to safeguard what is essential by yielding on what is secondary. For this reason they have drafted a text reforming marriage rites, which have been characterized increasingly by a class nature, since the marriage dowry has become too costly and thus beyond the means of candidates with limited incomes. Now one of the foundations of the Mزابite tradition is the use of mutual aid and economy to alleviate social disparities. This solidarity is threatened by the fact that some individuals go into debt for many years in order to be able to marry, while others abandon the faith and marry outside the Mزاب tradition, while girls of modest means are becoming "spinsters" in increasing numbers, a situation which creates worrisome problems of morality.

For the community, this situation poses a formidable threat and marriage reform appeared to the azzaba of Beni Isquen to be necessary as a defense against the deterioration and depravity which threatened it. After lengthy discussion, the text of this reform was approved. It includes a long list of prohibitions designed to simplify the marriage rituals and to reduce their cost substantially. The main beneficiaries of this reform are, naturally, individuals in the lower income categories. It is also a question of preserving endogamy within the community. By standardizing the marriage ceremonies, the mosque confirms its decisive moral authority, and also makes it possible to preserve what is essential, to wit the unity of the community, for which it serves as the agent of social cohesion, through the internal consensus (chura) over which it presides in particular, which allows, as the example of marriage reform shows, adaptation to the general trend of development.

The Experience in Casablanca

On the basis of a survey he undertook in Casablanca on the return to the cult of the saints, Bruno Etienne has tried to establish how Islam has perhaps developed a response to modern situations (which, in a country like Morocco, must inevitably be "the imposition of industrial roles in a society which is not industrial").

Is the cult of the saints solely the result of the exploitation of the credulity of the people (regarded as "imbeciles") by the charlatans? It would be too easy to reduce the living force of this practice to this "explanation" alone, even if it is true that the marabouts bring in money for their superiors (or the agents of the seyyid). B. Etienne sees in this a response to two situations: on the one hand, modern ways have too high a psychological and social cost, and the damage done cannot be dealt with by medicine which is clearly inadequate to the need and ill adapted (and thus the saints offer forms of therapy which are culturally and economically more appropriate,⁶ particularly where neuroses are concerned), while

on the other hand, Moroccan culture inculcates and reinforces an attitude of obedience and a certain passivity, since one component of the basic personality is a chain of authority internalized by all, the structure of which is "God--father--wali [governor]--husband--brother," in which it is understood that "authority always comes from above and through men." Now this chain contrasts with another which is compensatory and made up of "paternal imagos" (to use the psychoanalytical formula), involving the jinn--fqihi--moqadem, which are more "accessible" and can serve as mediators. In this way the anomies and tensions are provided with a framework which is culturally better integrated and more gratifying than the institutions of the modern authority or the disembodied religion of the Salafists.

Thus this offers a solution which does not require a break with the predominant cultural system. Tradition, on the level of social experience, includes resources which despite their seeming "archaic" nature provide a response to the traumas and tensions born of modern development. Is it a question of historical remnants needing to be swept away or is it indeed, as compared with orthodoxy, a sign (as the new troubadours, like Nass al Ghiwane, proclaim) that "the popular culture and religion will not die of rationality"? This is the question asked by B. Etienne. The question and discussion of it remain open.

Is it an accident that it is the women above all who turn to the seyyid? The system keeps them within the narrow limits of a rule which confines them to their role (even when their concrete situation are no longer entirely consistent with it) and their "traditional" subordinate status.

Concerning the status of women, and this is perhaps significant, it is above all the Algerian authors who have expressed their views in this work.

Souad Khodja stresses that the separation of the sexes lies at the base of the structure of the traditional society, and he examines the function of the relationship between Islam and tradition and women in sustaining social cohesion, as well as the challenge to it because of the departure of women from their "traditional" roles.

The Isolation of Women

The separation of the sexes and the predominance of masculine authority within the framework of the patriarchy underly social instruction from infancy on (for boys, circumcision marks their isolation from the world of women and entry into the world of "rodjla" (masculinity) and its values). Above all, in the groups living under precarious economic conditions, this social education does not allow the singling out individual personalities. The collective prevails over the individual, who must efface himself to guarantee unflinching social cohesion. The logic of this system excludes women and denigrates femininity (characterized by weakness, excess, sloth, impurity, etc...as compared to strength, mastery, honor, holiness, etc. This exclusion means the banishment of women from any authority, even that over their own bodies. Today, despite the formal equality for which the legislative text may provide between the two sexes, real inequality remains. The texts prohibit forced marriages ordered by the family and marriages prior to puberty. In practice, forced marriages and marriages prior to puberty still occur, since "for the majority of Algerian girls, to refuse to yield to the patriarchal authority is still today the equivalent of veritable suicide." Similarly, when it comes to divorce and inheritance, women are victims of profound inequalities.

The drafting of a family code has not proved to be an easy task in Algeria. A draft text was drawn up by the Ministry of Justice in 1966 but, judged "too obscurantist," it was not adopted, as was the fate of another proposal in 1973. Currently a draft is under discussion and has been the target of demonstrations and other forms of women's opposition. It is also said to be very conservative but with a better chance of being approved. The situation is paradoxical. Does the adoption of this family code, at a time when a woman has just been appointed a cabinet minister, indicate an increasing traditionalization of society, in view of the frustrations of the modern world (with the rise of the pro-Islam movement being a sign and exerting pressure here)? S. Khodja refers to the difficulty the government is having in challenging tradition, "while in other sectors, it has been able to politically very bold." Is this because "in the view of the apologists of tradition, emancipation for women is a threat to the patriarchal power structures? This kind of argument is implicitly endorsed even by those who elsewhere wage the battle for the modernization of Algerian society, whatever their political line or their relationship to Islam." This would suggest that the stakes which are at issue are not always clear or admissible.

The Pro-Islam Thrust

A survey taken by Nadia Cheilig Ainad-Tabet, in which 180 male and female secondary school students in Algiers, 134 in Constantine and 64 in Oran were asked "as a modern Algerian girl, how would you describe yourself?", supplies interesting indications about the trends in the groups represented in society, and in particular among the youth. Of the secondary school students questioned, 25 percent expressed the view that a woman in Algeria should be Moslem (according to the traditional dogma, with all that entails--veil, separation of sexes, domestic role, etc). Slightly fewer than 50 percent said she should be an Algerian Moslem (she can be educated and can work in unmixed environments, but her main concern should be her family duty and she should know her limitations). In the view of almost 25 percent, she should be a Moslem Algerian (Islam is an internal faith and fanaticism is condemned; co-education, public life, work, entertainment and physical training are acceptable). Finally, in the view of 7 percent, she need only be an "Algerian woman" (since religion was used in the past as an ideology to paralyze and prevent women's activities, and there is no difference between the sexes). It should be noted that those who saw girls as mainly "Moslem" were mainly from Constantine (which appeared to be more conservative than the other two regions), while the advocates of the "Moslem Algerian girl" and simply the "female Algerian citizen" were more commonly found in Algiers and Oran.

The return to tradition, the turn inward upon themselves and the maintenance of women within the framework of the security of the home are attitudes one finds here again among those who come from the less fortunate environments and those disrupted by socioeconomic competition. These are those who have been left behind by the winning of independence and the modern era which thus sees in religion "a model of an egalitarian society."

The pro-Islam movement thus corresponds to a demand which is a broadening trend.

What are the causes and the forms of this thrust of the pro-Islam movement in the countries of North Africa?

Change, Exodus, Imbalance

In Tunisia, where it is seemingly strongest, it is the disappointment of the late 1960's about schooling which no longer offers promise for the future which made its mark upon the youth.

The schools had little to offer, any more than did the modern state, when the crisis in society (social disparities, imbalances of all sorts) became more profound. In the view of A. Zghal, an ideological demand then developed, posing two questions simultaneously: the problem of cultural identity for the young people and society on the one hand, and the problem of injustice and social inequalities on the other.

Initially in Tunisia, the classic Salafist discussion was based on customs and did not pertain to politics, but after 1975, the current social and political problems were taken up to a greater extent, and following the Iranian revolution, militant positions were asserted still more clearly and the pro-Islam movement set out to win over the universities, which had remained the special preserve of the left wing since independence was won. In a seeming paradox, it is the faculties of science and technology which are, therefore, the most faithful to Islam (wherein "discourse, like scientific logic, demands in its fashion a certain rigor in thought and in conduct"). In analyzing this same phenomenon, Y. Ben Achour stresses that, contrary to certain suppositions, the activities pursued by the Bourguiba regime against Zaytuna and the vacuum thus created do not suffice to explain the emergence of the pro-Islam movement, because in Morocco, and above all in Egypt, the perennial existence of Qarawiyyin and Al Azhar has not constituted any hindrance to the development of such a movement.

The profound causes have more to do with the social changes, the imbalance among the classes, the rural exodus, the impoverishment in transport facilities and housing, inflation, unemployment and the political crisis in the regime itself. There are also the heterogeneous nature and contradiction in the moral values and customs in the country, and today the pro-Islam movement contrasts "the austere and primitive morality of Islam...with the immorality, the sexuality and the injustice of the society produced by the regime."

The movement which bears the name "Al Ittijah al Islami" is not organized as a party, but remains a decentralized organization and forms a sort of subsystem, a "parallel society" within society (we are familiar with the wave of repression against its leaders and a large number of its members in the course of the last year).

In Morocco, the development of the pro-Islam movement, with the formation of some 30 religious associations, is described by B. Etienne and M. Tozy as "perhaps the best way of defending class interests for the stratum which has benefited least from the advantages of modernization." In the past there existed such associations for the defense of Islam as the Ar-Rabita al Islamiya, headed by Drs Khatib and Ben Aboud, which is more integrist than the orthodox League of Ulama. The pro-Islam associations are characterized by their proselytizing zeal and their challenge of orthodoxy, their discreet if not secret if not secret operations, their desire to replace the brotherhoods (except the Budchichya), and closer relations with the Arab-Moslem world than with the Moroccan political-religious hierarchy. Their field of action is the mosques, the secondary schools and the university. The authors distinguish among four different unofficial types of associations. The first claims not to engage in politics but to be dedicated solely to "da'wa" (preaching). The

The second, closely related to Saudi Arabia, is sponsored by Abu Bakr al Jazairi and Taqiddin al Hilali, an extremist reformer who is an enemy of Sufism and its brotherhoods, while the third is made up of the associations influenced by the doctrinarians in the Moslem Brotherhood (with which no Moslem group should be compared, the authors insist). The fourth category is made up of the "modern Salafists," who want to go back to the sources to adapt them to the requirements of modern Morocco.

The pro-Islam groups also want to set themselves apart both from the classic Moslem (wearing of the beard or the "hija," militant opposition to the "munkar") and the Sufi (the pro-Islam movement is exoteric, seeking application of the "shari'a" and not the mystical search for the "haqiqat").

The pro-Islam movement in Morocco remains more dispersed and diffused on the organizational level. Its only common platform is Abdessalam Yacine's periodical AL JAMA'A and his writings. The seeking of power ("by the democratic path, which we support if it is not falsified," according to Yacine) by the pro-Islam movement is based on five axes: education of the people in small groups, pending the establishment of a single "jam'ya," rejection of any alliance with the political parties regarded as the enemies of Islam, rejection of secret organizational procedures which bring down the wrath of the authorities, organization of cultural weeks in the university cities, and insistence on the need for government by the fuqaha', since their tutelage does not suffice.

Diversity of Concepts

As elsewhere in North Africa, the pro-Islam movement provides an answer to the requirement which developed in reaction to modern developments and their frustrations, and the authors warn against a "trivial interpretation of the Marxist criticism of religion," because by reducing religious exaltation to ideology, a purely economic analysis would neglect its messianic and radical dimension (in certain historical circumstances, such as existed in Germany with the preaching of Thomas Muntzer).

The pro-Islam movement is the subject of various assessments in this work. For example the Algerian Nadia Chelig is concerned that "dedication to the past and chauvinism" might become "a tool of manipulation in the hands of pressure groups seeking power." A. Zghal, for his part, points out that certain aspects of the pro-Islamic discourse tends toward terrorism. It demands a return to religious law, but who can claim to have interpreted the texts truly?

The concepts urging a return to the sources do in fact vary greatly, since to mention only established regimes claiming to be Moslem, what common features are to be found between the regime of Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistan and that of Khomeini or Qadhdhafi? Hasn't the last-mentioned, for his part, abandoned the Hadith as one of the foundations of the Sunna, deeming only the Koran beyond challenge (since the "hadiths" attributed to the prophet were in many cases fabricated for current political or economic purposes over the course of the centuries, long after his death). Similarly, the "fiqh" and their various doctrines are suspect in the eyes of Qadhdhafi, as S. A. Al Assiouty shows. Qadhdhafi regards them as positive law, the product of human reason, and not like the "shari'a," truly "Islamic," being found solely in the Koran. Thus Qadhdhafi justifies marriage reform, the principle of emancipation of women, the prohibition of polygamy and the official ownership of the conjugal domicile by the wife in his "Green Book."

The periodical AL MA'RIFA of the Tunisian pro-Islam movement, on the contrary, is stricter and rejects democracy, for example, because this would be unacceptable in a Moslem state, since only the "party of Allah" should exist. A. Zaghal emphasizes that if some leaders of the movement favor a critical review of their practice and that of the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt, they remain basically supporters of the unity of the Umma, without being capable at the same time of considering the concept of its sociological diversity." And in this the author sees the embryo "of a more deadly utopia than any secular utopia, because it claims to be of God."

Whether it be a question of official Islam, its institutions, texts and practices, or of the popular tradition and the ways in which it has adapted to the development of society, or again the movements which urge a return to Islamic purity in order to reform this society, these are all various facets of a complex development in which the societies of the Maghreb reveal both the conflicts of interest which divide them, their search for their identity, the confusion of their young people and the groping toward survival or toward their future.

FOOTNOTES

1. "The Moslem Maghreb in 1979," collected work compiled by Christiane Souriau (taken from the ANNUAIRE DE L'AFRIQUE DU NORD 1979), publications of the CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research], Paris, 1981.
2. Let us note here that the weekly day of rest is Friday, as it is in Libya and the majority of the Arab countries, while the Sunday holiday remains in effect in Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritania.
3. See, for greater detail, "Islam and Politics in Morocco," LAMALIF, January 1981.
4. In comparison to the upsets experienced in Algeria, those which occurred in Moroccan society were perhaps less brutal, but were they less broad in scope?
5. Often ranked with the Kharijites, the Abadites reject any affiliation with their belief, regarding even the movements produced by it as heretical. The main doctrinal points in the Abadite belief are the creation of the Koran (as professed by the Motazilite doctrine), the nonvision of God in the next world, the belief that faith is word and action, and that intercession (chafa'a) is available only to the Moslem adhering completely to his religion. However, according to N. Arkoun (in "Arab Thought," "Que sais-je" Collection, p 71): "Under cover of strict profession of the Abadite faith (the Mzabites) succeeded in perpetuating typically Berber sociopolitical structures, trade and representation procedures and beliefs."
6. The author reports by way of an example a cure in Sidi ben Ichou. "A young girl was brought from her family from Skhirat. A melancholic, she wept and implored the "jnoun" to leave her alone. (These spirits spoke through her, in various voices and tones). She said 'there are six of us' and explained that the "jnoun" possessed her because her family would not let her go to work in a shop in the city. Her parents made her leave school to work at home and would not let her go out.

"The family had already taken her to other saints, a 'seyyid" recommended a 'dbiha' (sacrifice of a black goat). Everyone discussed it and said that the 'jnoun'...suggested 'letting her go to work!' This example seems to me typical of a real cure. The girl herself formulated her unconscious responses and proposed a logical therapy." Elsewhere, the Algerian writer Y. Fekkar also describes "feminine therapies to deal with existential anguish" and concludes that "one can without a doubt understand on this basis the evident disinterest of modern Moslems in the psychoanalytical couch."

5157

CSO: 4519/127

FUTURE CONFRONTATION WITH WEST LIKELY

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1320, 19 Feb 82 p 45

[Article by 'Adnan Karimah: "Battle of Challenges on Oil Pricing"]

[Text] When the OPEC oil ministers decided to unify prices back in September 1981 and which were supposed to last until the end of 1982, some said that such prices were not going to hold for long before coming under increasing pressure to be decreased. At the same time others said that those prices will have to be increased. And yet a third body said that the prices will remain at the same level until the end of 1983.

There is no doubt that each one of the above views has a different way of looking at the supply and demand market. They also differ in their opinion on the progression of that market in view of the past economic challenges especially in the industrialized nations. Those challenges led to an increase in the industrial nations' oil consumption which in turn led to an increase in world oil production and especially that of the OPEC countries.

But what is the current market condition?

There is a huge oil glut which is threatening to disrupt prices. Such a glut was created despite the harsh winter which Europe and the United States went through. The glut has forced some exporters to offer incentives to buyers in various forms one of which was a grace period of 30-45 days, as was the case in some Iranian and Arab deals. That meant a decrease in the price of a barrel of about one-fourth of a dollar. Other incentives took the form of overt price reductions, as was the case in the North Shore oil (no connection to OPEC) which went down by an average of \$3.25 from the basic official price of \$36.50.

Oil sources in the industrial nations began to welcome the news regarding the need for a decision by OPEC, in view of current market conditions, of a likely price reduction during its emergency meeting to which the oil ministers of its countries could be invited before their usual meeting which is scheduled to be held next 20 May in Quito, Ecuador's capital.

In an effort to safeguard the unified price structure, some OPEC countries have decided on a gradual production cutback. In that respect Kuwait limited

its production to 600,000 b/d which is the lowest level of its modern oil production history. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has also decreased its production. Its production as of this past January was less than 8 million b/d and it appears that Saudi Arabia is ready to begin a gradual decrease in production eventually reaching 6.5 million b/d in order to protect the \$34 price. That is according to what Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Saudi minister of petroleum, said in an interview with the NEW YORK TIMES. The question, therefore, is: Will the OPEC countries be able to protect that price?

The fact is that the battle within the supply and demand market is going to be a long one and it could continue well into the beginning of 1983. Such would be the case especially if the economic recession in the industrial nations and in the United States continues to that date as expected. Such an outcome is also likely if one keeps in mind that the new estimates concerning the economic recovery differ from the previous estimates.

Therefore if on the one side consumption is in the hand of the industrial countries, production, on the other side, is in the hand of the OPEC countries. It would be possible then to keep prices stable through a production and export plan agreed upon by OPEC countries under the leadership of Saudi Arabia.

Evident at this point is the problem concerning the monetary need of the oil countries which makes it essential for them to get their returns on their oil exports in order to cover their necessary expenses and to finance their developmental plans. That, however, could be resolved in either one of two ways. First, it could be accomplished through a framework of a unified production plan whereby any one country could increase its production while another decreases its own. Second, the problem of monetary need could be resolved through a loaning system whereby one country can lend capital to a needy country until the pricing problem passes through the supply and demand battle on the international market.

Here, the question becomes: Will the OPEC countries be able to face this war and come out winning? Winning can be the only answer to such a question as long as the Gulf countries remain united. Within the Gulf Cooperation Council there are six countries producing 65 percent of OPEC's production. If one was to add the production figures of three other Arab countries--Iraq, Libya and Algeria--the percentage rises to 75. Therefore, keeping in mind that the number of Arab countries in OPEC is 9 out of 13, should they not be successful in their challenge--God forbid--the defeat in the eyes of the industrial nations will be an Arab one. Should that defeat come about it would be due to the usual Arab differences on which the West has always relied for achieving its interests not only in the economic field but also in the political and military fields as well.

It is the battle of challenges. The industrial West has proved, up till now, its ability to reduce its oil consumption; an ability which was enhanced by the economic recession. The question then follows: Will the Arabs be able to prove that they can unite and face that challenge?

CSO: 4404/324

BRIEFS

MAZAR-I SHARIF NITROGEN FACTORY--Ashkhabad SOVET TURKMENISTANY in Turkmen 4 November 1981, page 3, carries a 700-word article by A. Sukhoparov discussing the current status of Mazar-i Sharif in Afghanistan. On opponents of the Afghan regime it is noted that "calling themselves 'defenders of Islam,' they do not refrain from killing mollahs, imams of mosques and similar religious workers." Also, a brief description is given of the nitrogen fertilizer factory which "is considered one of the largest industrial factories of the country." The factory produces "105,000 tons a year." It is supported by a 36,000 kilowatt electric station. "The work of installing a new energy turbine has been completed." It will increase power to 48,000 kilowatts. The factory employs "close to 5,000 workers." [Editorial Report]

CSO: 1834/105

ALGERIA

BRIEFS

ALGERIAN CONCERN—Algiers, 14 Feb--Strengthened U.S.-Moroccan military ties are such as to "arouse serious concern in North-West Africa and beyond to the whole of the Arab and African world," the official Algerian news agency APS said in a commentary on U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig's Morocco talks this week. The commentary, republished at length today in the Algerian press, said Mr. Haig's talks with King Hassan II were "the culmination of steps by the White House to revise radically its policy" in the region. The results of Mr. Haig's talks were outlined yesterday to Algerian Foreign Minister Mohamed Benyahia and Defence Ministry Secretary-General Colonel Mustapha Belloucif by visiting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Nicolas Veliotis. Informed sources said the Algerian officials expressed keen anxiety over the danger of seeing North Africa become a zone of East-West tension. They expressed anxiety about the delivery of U.S. arms to Morocco, which they believed would use them to step up its "repression of the Sahrawi people" in the disputed Western Sahara. Mr. Haig and King Hassan agreed to set up a joint U.S.-Moroccan military commission in view of a "threat" from Libya allegedly supported by the Soviet Union. More U.S. arms supplies to Morocco and the use of Moroccan bases by American Forces were also discussed. APS alleged today: "Morocco in its headlong flight appears to be giving itself the means for new adventures. "While refusing to confine the Western Sahara conflict to a bilateral framework with the Polisario Front (the Saharan nationalist movement), Morocco intends to enlarge the dimensions of this conflict and is clearly uttering threats against its neighbours Algeria and Mauritania." (A.F.P.) [Text] [Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2872, 16 Feb 82 p 8]

CSO: 4500/114

OFFSHORE BANK PROFITS RISE

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 7, 15 Feb 82 pp 7-8

[Text]

Five offshore banks operating from Bahrain have disclosed increased profits for last year.

The Gulf Riyadh Bank, which is owned 60 per cent by the Riyadh Bank and 40 per cent by Crédit Lyonnais, boosted its net earnings by 30 per cent to \$5.2 million in 1981. Loans and advances rose from \$250 million to \$421 million. Like the other banks, the Gulf Riyadh Bank is an exempt company (EC) under Bahrain's foreign ownership rules.

The European Arab Banks (Middle East EC) reported profits up by 72 per cent to \$3.1 million and lending up from \$159 million to \$429 million.

BAII (Middle East EC), which in 1980 operated under name of BAII Middle East, incorporated in Panama, showed a rise in its profits of 60 per cent to \$2.4 million, while lending went up 11 per cent to \$194 million.

Arab Asian Bank revealed a profit of \$5 million for the 11 months since its change to EC status from a subsidiary of the Arab Malaysian Development Bank. Lending more than doubled to \$312 million.

Profits at the FRAB-Bank (Middle East EC) rose 10 per cent to \$1.9 million with loans up 46 per cent to \$98 million. In a related development, it was announced last week that Yves Bernard, chairman of the FRAB group, which includes the Paris-based FRAB-Bank International and the FRAB-Bank (Middle East) is to resign his appointments on March 31. This follows the purchase of the non-Arab shareholding in the FRAB consortium by the National Bank of Kuwait.

Abdul Aziz Hamad al-Sagar will become chairman of FRAB-Bank International on that date and Mohammed Abdul Mohsin al-Kharafi will replace Mr Bernard as chairman of FRAB-Bank (Middle East). Tony Gedeon is to join the group from Morgan Guaranty and will become manager of FRAB-Bank International. The General Manager of the National Bank of Kuwait, John Athorne, will be responsible for overall supervision of the group's

activities, while continuing to look after the National Bank of Kuwait's overseas development.

Last year, the National Bank of Kuwait bought the 50 per cent share in the Banque Franco-Arabe d'Investissements Internationaux (FRAB-Bank International) previously held by European and Japanese banks. The purchase brought the Kuwaiti bank's holdings in the FRAB consortium to just over 51 per cent. The 12-year old FRAB Bank, with assets estimated at \$1.3 billion, is now 100 per cent owned by Arab banks, institutions and financial groups.

The National Bank of Kuwait paid about \$25 million to buy out a number of banks, including Société Générale, Amro Bank, Industrial Bank of Japan and Banco Urquijo. The remainder of the FRAB-Bank's shares are held by Arab interests in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, the UAE, Bahrain, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.

There is a general trend on the part of Arab financial institutions to buy out their European partners in consortium banks. Last year, Crédit Lyonnais sold its shareholding in the holding company which controls another Euro-Arab consortium bank, the Union des Banques Arabes et Françaises (UBAF).

AL-MA'ADI HOSPITAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS RE-FORMED

Cairo AL-WAQA'I' AL-MISRIYAH [The Egyptian Minutes--Daily Supplement of the Egyptian Gazette] in Arabic No 282, 12 Dec 81 pp 4-6

[Ministry of Defense Decrees]

[Text] Decree No 141 of 1981 Re-Forming Board of Directors of al-Ma'adi Armed Forces Hospital:

The Minister of Defense and War Production,

After perusing law No 4 of 1968 concerning command and control of the state defense affairs, amended by law No 12 of 1968,

Presidential decree No 612 of 1968 on amending some provisions of the presidential decrees concerning the armed forces,

Presidential decree No 789 of 1969 delegating certain powers to the minister of defense,

Presidential decree No 1764 of 1974 on the medical treatment and care for the armed forces personnel and their families,

Minister of war decree No 125 of 1970 concerning the statutes pertaining to al-Ma'adi armed forces hospital,

And minister of war decree No 203 of 1974 on the regulations concerning the medical treatment and care for the armed forces personnel and their families,

Has decided:

Article 1

The text of article 11 of the statute concerning al-Ma'adi armed forces hospital, issued in accordance with minister of war decree No 125 of 1970, shall be replaced by the following text:

Article 11. The board of directors of al-Ma'adi armed forces hospital shall be formed in the following manner:

The armed forces chief of staff, chairman.

The chief of the armed forces Organization and Administration Authority;

The armed forces Supply Authority chief;

The armed forces Financial Affairs Authority chief;

The Ministry of Defense secretary general;

The director of the Armed Forces Officers' Affairs Department;

The director of the Armed Forces Medical Services Department;

The Military Medical Academy chief;

The armed forces medical services chief of staff;

The director of al-Ma'adi armed forces hospital.

The head of the medical branch of the air forces;

The head of the medical branch of the air defense forces;

And the head of the medical branch of the naval forces as members.

A secretary appointed by the Board of Directors shall carry out the secretarial work of the board. This secretary shall have no vote in the board and shall record the minutes of the board sessions, have them approved by the board chairman, notify the authorities concerned and follow up their implementation.

Article 2

This decree shall be published in AL-WAQA'I' AL-MISRIYAH and shall go into effect as of the date of its publication. Any provision conflicting with this decree's contents shall be abolished.

Issued on 3 October 1981.

Lt Gen Muhammad 'Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazalah

8494

CSO: 4504/140

IRON, STEEL PRODUCTION IMPROVING SINCE EXPULSION OF SOVIETS

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 674, 14 Dec 81 pp 22-24

[Interview with Engineer Fu'ad Abu Zaghlah, Chairman of Iron and Steel Company, by Mustafa Imam; "Story of Soviet Experts in Steel Plant and Why Their Expulsion Was Delayed for One Year; Did Production Actually Rise by 17 Percent Only 3 Days After Expulsion of Experts; Why Did President al-Sadat Decide to Delay Expulsion Decision for One Year; Western Expertise Corrects Mistakes of Soviets"]

[Text] On the 15th of last September, the Egyptian government decided to expel the Soviet ambassador, to cancel the contracts of the Soviet experts in the Iron and Steel Company and to deport them from Egypt within one week. Three days after the decision, 200 Soviet experts in the company had been deported.

The Egyptian experts began to replace the Soviet experts and to supervise production in the fourth furnace. On the second day of the Soviet experts' departure, the Egyptian daily press declared, quoting some company officials, that production in the fourth furnace had risen by 17 percent within just 3 days. The incident of increased production by such a rate and in such a short period provoked numerous comments and some people considered the declarations an exaggeration on the part of the company officials to please the political leadership which had announced the expulsion decision.

At the time, the incident and the suspicions of exaggeration raised around it could not be discussed in the light of political circumstances precluding such a discussion and under the canopy of a sweeping Egyptian enthusiasm for the success of the Egyptians in replacing the Soviet experts. The incident was likened to the incident of the Egyptian pilots taking over the work in the Suez Canal after its nationalization in 1956.

Thus, the incident has continued to plague company officials making the statements while waiting for a calm and frank interview to be conducted with them in order to reveal what truly happened and the real story behind the expulsion of the Soviet experts from the company.

Interview Conducted

Therefore, we have had this interview with Engineer Fu'ad Abu Zaghlah, the Iron and Steel Company chairman, who has told us after more than 2 months, and frankly, whether the production of the fourth furnace, which had been under the supervision of the Soviet experts, did increase by 17 percent in just 3 days after the experts had been ousted from the work.

He has also told us how the Egyptian management and experts had prepared for the day and whether the company officials knew of the expulsion decision before it was announced by the political leadership. He has also told us whether President al-Sadat had actually decided in the summer of 1980 to expel the Soviet experts from the company and whether he changed his mind afterwards and decided to postpone the decision when he was convinced that the expulsion would do Egypt more harm than good at the time.

Numerous questions were raised when the Soviet experts were expelled last September.

Nature of Agreement

But before discussing these questions now, we must make clear from the outset the nature of the agreement between Egypt and the Soviet Union concerning the expansions in the Iron and Steel Company.

Engineer Fu'ad Abu Zaghlah says: "The agreement with the Soviets dates back to 1964 when a complete contract was concluded with them to introduce expansions into the Iron and Steel Company with the aim of raising production from 300,000 tons to 1 million tons annually by the end of the project and with the aim of having the Soviets supervise the mining of iron ore from al-Wahat al-Bahriyah.

"The project costs amounted to 300 million pounds at the 1968 prices and are estimated at 1.5 billion pounds at today's prices.

"The costs were financed by Soviet loans in accordance with a cooperation agreement between the two countries. Repayment of the loans is over 12 years at an annual interest rate of 3 percent, with the repayments starting as of the date of operation of the equipment.

"According to this agreement, the Soviet side prepares the blueprints, supplies the equipment, trains the workers and supervises the construction and operation. The project took 10 years [to complete]. The first furnace was put into operation in December 1973 and the second in June 1979. The number of [Soviet] experts during the construction and operation stages amounted to nearly 1,000 experts whose wages and residence expenses were paid by the Egyptian government in accordance with this agreement. But this number began to decrease until it dropped to 200 experts at the time when President al-Sadat announced the Soviet experts' expulsion decision in the middle of last September."

My Responsibility

[Question] The details of the story begin with the announcement by the press about the rise of production in the fourth furnace, which had been under the supervision of the Soviet experts, to 1,900 tons daily, with a daily increase of 150 tons after only 3 days of the expulsion of the experts. Frankly, could the fourth furnace produce the announced increase, namely 150 tons daily?

[Answer] The furnace capacity can generate an increase of more than 150 tons daily. The monthly program amounts to 50,000 tons. The furnace production ranges at times from 45,000 to 50,000 tons, depending on the regularity of the production process. What happened in the wake of the expulsion of the Soviet experts is that the furnace was operated at maximum capacity in three consecutive shifts [daily]. The workers concentrated on every detail and this is what led to the increase that was realized.

[Question] But the increase rate then dropped in October, what is your comment?

[Answer] The increase rate did actually drop but the production was still higher than when the furnace was under the supervision of the Soviet experts. What is important is that there has been no drop in productivity, contrary to the expectations of some foreign papers.

(He added) Taking full responsibility, I today with supporting figures--that iron production rose by 927 tons, or 17 percent, 3 days after the expulsion of the experts. Cast iron, produced by the fourth furnace, rose from 4,430 tons at the time when the Soviet experts were ousted to 5,357 tons and steel production rose from 5,575 tons to 6,478 tons, i.e. by nearly 17 percent.

Disappointed Expectations

(Engineer Abu Zaghlah further added): "It had been expected that production would drop or that the production levels would remain as they had been during the time of the Soviet experts' supervision. But the fact is that the Egyptian experts and workers spared no effort to prove the Egyptian capability. Egyptian and Western media converged on the company plants to see how the Egyptians were doing after the ousting of the Soviet experts. Both U.S. and German television networks filmed the work on the spot. As officials, we did not try to announce any figures on increase in (production). However, we could not conceal this extraordinary effort by the workers from the press and the media."

Reduced Production Is Responsibility of Russians

[Question] We wonder, did the increase continue at the same rate as of the second half of September?

[Answer] The increase rate in October was lower than in September. However, it was higher than in August when the Russians were in charge. [In August], cast iron production from the fourth furnace amounted to 48,560 tons and steel

production amounted to 49,000 tons. In September, cast iron production rose to 21,681 tons [sic] and steel production to 52,455 tons. In October, the fourth furnace's cast iron production dropped to 51,282 tons but steel production rose to 53,480 tons. The increase in steel production is due to the fact that more than one furnace produces cast iron which flows into the steel furnace. The drop in cast iron production is due to flaws in the iron ore which contains salts. The party responsible for this are the Russians who analyzed the ore and supervised its mining.

Maintenance Story

[Question] What is the story of the maintenance carried out by the Egyptian experts for the third furnace, considering that the Soviet experts had been engaged in and supervising this maintenance for 10 days? How was the Egyptian expertise able to complete the work?

[Answer] I would not be exaggerating if I said that the Egyptians succeeded in carrying out the maintenance with their own efforts only 10 days after the Soviet experts had left the work [sic]. The maintenance operation takes nearly 75 days. This did not happen haphazardly or overnight. From the start of the planning for the maintenance, I had insisted that the Egyptian technicians participate with the Soviets in all stages of the preparation for the maintenance. Implementation then started and this is why the Egyptian experts were able to complete the work. The third furnace will be put [back] into operation next week. I have been careful to record all the stages of the maintenance operation in a documentary film so that we may make use of it when preparing for the maintenance of the fourth furnace.

Why Did President Decide on Postponement?

[Question] Had you been aware of the expulsion of the Soviet experts and did you make preparations in advance? Is it true that President al-Sadat had decided to expel the Soviet experts in the summer of 1980 but then changed his mind?

[Answer] No, I had not been aware of last September's decision on the experts. However, we had made preparations for such a day. This has a story which dates back to the summer of 1980 when President al-Sadat announced his intention to expel the Soviet experts from the iron and steel companies. At the time, I contacted the minister of industry and told him that I, as a concerned citizen, believed that he should ask the president to postpone the expulsion decision because if the Soviet experts were expelled at that time, the cooperation agreement between the two countries would be abrogated and Egypt would end up losing many of the rights stipulated by the agreement. The president agreed to postpone the decision. As for the reasons calling for that postponement, they lie in the fact that the Soviet Union had not yet supplied all the equipment necessary for the expansion. Moreover, abrogation of the agreement would have meant that it would have been a problem for Egypt to import the equipment at the same price.

Preparation

[Engineer Abu Zaghlah added): "But we began as of that time completing all our equipment and completing the training of Egyptians in preparation for the moment of announcement of the political decision to expel the Soviet experts. A definite timetable ending in 1980 was prepared and the responsibilities of the Egyptian cadres were defined."

Problem of Salts

[Question] Can expulsion of the Soviet experts pose problems to the production of steel at the current rates, especially since there is the problem of the presence of salts in the mined iron ore?

[Answer] The salts appearing in the iron ore are the responsibility of the Soviets because they are the ones who made the analyses. The appearance of the salts has led to reducing the cast iron production of the fourth furnace.

But we will overcome this problem. A study is being currently conducted to improve the mined ores and this study is expected to be completed this year.

Western Expertise

(Engineer Abu Zaghlah adds:) "There is also the old plant which is now in poor condition. We have acquired a loan of 90 million Deutsche marks from West Germany to renew the plant--the steel rolling units.

"We have also acquired a \$64 million loan from the World Bank to carry out renewal operations and to eliminate the production bottlenecks created by the Russians, such as changing some equipment and machinery and completing some workshops and various technological operations in production. The assistance of experts of the British Steel Company has been employed to offer technical expertise on the operational problems. The actual measures to solve these problems will begin in 1982 and our production can rise from 850,000 tons [annually] to 1.2 million tons annually in 1985. The World Bank will also provide another loan to implement the second phase of the project aimed at adding some equipment so as to raise production to 1.6 million tons in 1987, i.e. to raise production by 100,000 tons beyond the capacity of the project agreed upon with the Soviets.

"These solutions will change the shape of the Arab and African countries and it will be possible for us to export part of our production to the Arab and African countries. At present, we meet the needs of the local market. Moreover, 50,000 tons of steel have been exported to the European market."

Contacts Begun in 1979

[Question] Was agreement reached on replacing the Soviet expertise by Western expertise and on employing the assistance of the World Bank before the expulsion of the Soviet experts?

[Answer] The contacts with the World Bank were established while the Soviets were supervising production in 1979. However, we did not start implementation with the West until after expulsion of the Russian experts.

8494

CSO: 4504/140

EXTRA ALLOCATIONS FOR POLICE MILITARY OPERATIONS

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 28 Feb 82 p 2

[Text] Yesterday morning the Council of Ministers of the Iran Islamic Republic met under the chairmanship of the prime minister, engineer Musavi, and opened the meeting with a reading of verses from the holy Koran.

According to the report of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY (IRNA) correspondent, the meeting opened with a review of news from the war and events in the region, following which the latest political, social and economic changes in the country were discussed and views were exchanged. At this meeting the secretary of the economics and finance committee of the Council of Ministers presented a report on the latest decisions of this committee. Following the discussion and review of the proposals and decisions of the economics and finance committee, 11 parts of the Council of Ministers' decree were approved. Some of these approved parts are as follows:

- 1) Allocation of funds amounting to 482 million rials for the completion of the petrochemical industrial project.
- 2) Allocation of the sum of 219 billion rials to pay for the expenses of gendarmerie activities.
- 3) Approval of a credit in the amount of 200 million rials as extra payment for police military activities.
- 4) The sum of 50 million rials was put at the disposal of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance to pay for communications and customs expenditures of the IRNA.
- 5) Allocation of 160 million rials to pay the salaries of the Khorramshahr general warehouse workers.

At yesterday's meeting of the Council of Ministers, Minister of Housing and Urban Development Gonabadi, who is also the secretary of the technical committee, submitted its proposals. There was an exchange of views, following which some of these were approved. The report of the services committee was then submitted, and after it was discussed and reviewed, the following decisions that had been proposed by the committee were approved:

- 1) The separation of the center for mental growth of children and adolescents from the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education and its transfer to the Ministry of Education.
- 2) Authority to conclude insurance agreements with the assistance of experienced dentists by the Ministry of Health.
- 3) Change of the name of Iranair to Iran Islamic Republic Airlines.

At yesterday's meeting the minister of foreign affairs reported on his meeting with Olaf Palme, who has traveled to Iran for the seventh time in relation to talks on the imposed war. Afterwards Mr Asgharnia, the governor of Kurdistan, who was present at yesterday's meeting of the Council of Ministers, presented a comprehensive report on activities in this province. The IRNA reporter notes that at the last joint seminar between the Council of Ministers and the governors, the prime minister had stated that in order to present reports and to expedite elimination of difficulties in the provinces, the brother governors should participate in turn in the Council of Ministers' meetings.

In a remark on the need for further reinforcement of agriculture and industry in the region, the governor of Kurdistan invited the ministers to hold a seminar for this purpose in Kurdistan. He also referred to certain difficulties in this province, and the appropriate decisions to remove them were adopted.

The governor of Kurdistan noted that... the united front of atheism is claiming that there is no security in Kurdistan; whereas today the toiling Kurdish Muslim people see that atheist and hypocritical subgroups make 12-year olds and students the target of machine guns and put mines under the tractors of the toiling Kurdish villagers to explode them; and they know that these are not the protectors of the Kurdish people.

He proposed that flights of Iran Islamic Republic Airlines between Tehran and Sanandaj be resumed. According to our reporter, in order to rebuild the administration of Western Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, the prime minister granted special powers to the governors of these two provinces.

At the end of yesterday's meeting of the Council of Ministers, the minister of culture and higher education referred to the participation by Iran in the next UNESCO conference, and the Council of Ministers approved his heading a delegation to this conference.

CSO: 4640/188

AGRICULTURAL, DEVELOPMENT PLANS ACTIVATED FOR PROVINCES

Sistan va Baluchestan

Tehran BURS in Persian 29 Dec 81 p 4

[Text] The Sistan va Baluchestan Planning Committee held a session at the Zabol governor's offices attended by Dr Mohammadi, Governor General of this province, and with the participation of the directors general, officials of the province's administrative organizations, and officials from government organizations from the Sistan area. According to a report by the PARS NEWS AGENCY correspondent, at the outset, after reading verses from the holy Koran Dr Mohammadi, Governor General of Sistan va Baluchestan, while referring to plots by West-afflicted people, who have wanted to make us as dependent on the West as possible since the revolution by relying on science and technology, said: Even though we know that the Great Satan and all the exploitative powers of the world have not stopped bothering us, we are going to begin with our correct planning for the long and short terms. The Governor General of Sistan va Baluchestan said: The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is paying full attention to this province, and it has allocated 1 billion 200 million tumans credit to this province for the current year. This budget is four times the budget for previous years. It is reported that Sistan va Baluchestan's budget for next year will exceed 9 billion 600 million tumans, while credit extended for development in the year prior to the victory of the revolution was no more than 120 million tumans.

In Khuzestan

Tehran BURS in Persian 31 Dec 81 p 4

[Text] Engineer Tavalla'i, Supervisor of the Khuzestan Governor General's offices, met with Prime Minister Engineer Musavi accompanied by governors, office chiefs in the Governor's offices, and officials and representatives from the Revolutionary Guard and the Reconstruction Crusade from this province and reported on their activities and the measures they have taken.

Engineer Musavi told Khuzestan officials: The days have been hard for the people of Khuzestan since the beginning of the revolution. The result of their resistance has been that the liars and compromisers have been pushed aside so that the believers and those who speak the truth could be recognized in society and their true nature could be demonstrated in the war of truth against falsity.

The Prime Minister added: These hardships were the preliminaries for a future opening and plans so that the oppressed people of Khuzestan might find growth and burgeoning in the path of divine values. He said: The government has made decisions for the reconstruction of Khuzestan. These decisions will require solid planning. In these plannings we must try not to go in a direction that is inappropriate to the people's revolutionary character. An important consideration for us is postwar reconstruction, so that we can make use of the people's active power, because the government is more mindful of these areas than the capitol.

Referring to the importance of reconstructing Khuzestan and revitalizing this province's industry, the Prime Minister said: One of the problems besetting us since the war has been the problem of industries, which have come to a standstill. We ask responsible brothers to take note of this fundamental problem, because these matters are inseparable from the reconstruction of this province. God willing, the news we receive from you brothers will be promising news.

In Khorasan

Tehran BURS in Persian 4 Jan 82 p 8

[Text] In the year 1361 [21 March 1982-20 March 1983] funds for road construction in Khorasan will increase from 220 million tumans to 430 million tumans, and funds for agriculture will increase from 30 million tumans to 220 million tumans. This was announced by brother Mohammad Nabi Habibi, Governor General of Khorasan, at a briefing held in Mashhad for governors of various parts of the province. He added: With a view to the existing problems with expanding the rural highway system and with problems of agriculture in Khorasan, studies have been made on the basis of which this province's appropriation funds for the year 1361 compared to the current year will be around two or three times greater. Therefore these two problems will be given special priorities. The ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY correspondent reported that at the briefing for the governors of Khorasan, which opened with readings of verses from the holy Koran, the Governor General of Khorasan stressed the critical responsibilities of the governors in the accurate recognition of the area's issues and problems and in presenting constructive proposals. He asked them to utilize the people's constructive proposals in regional projects and planning. At this session the governors of Khorasan's various municipalities also discussed the issues and problems in their own work.

East Azarbaijan

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 31 Dec 81 p 12

[Text] By making use of our farm production plan in the municipality of Tabriz, this unit will produce 7,500,000 day-old chicks every year and East Azarbaijan will have no need to import day-old chicks.

Engineer Kazem Damnabi, Director General of the East Azarbaijan Department of Agriculture, in announcing this yesterday morning in an exclusive interview with a correspondent from the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY, said: "The aforesaid factory will be established with capital equivalent to 600,000,000 rials by the

Ministry of Agriculture. So far 40 percent of the construction work has been completed and it is anticipated that it will be in operational stage by next year." He added: "By making use of this unit 7,500,000 day-old chicks will be produced annually and in this way the province of East Azarbaijan will have no need to import day-old chicks."

Concerning the procurement of protein needed by the province, the East Azarbaijan Director General of Agriculture said: "A plan for fish cultivation in manmade ponds in the municipality of Moghan has been set for this purpose with 38 million rials in funds. So far 160,000 fish have been brought from the Northern part of the country to the area for cultivation and 60,000 more will be brought in within several days for the same purpose."

He said: "By implementing this plan, which will begin next year, 300 tons of fish will be procured and provided to consumers."

The Director General of the East Azarbaijan Department of Agriculture said that another measure that this office is taking to procure some of the province's meat and eggs consumption is the distribution of laying hens among village and city families. He said that this year around 30,000 laying hens have been distributed among city and village families so that in this way chickens for home consumption can be guaranteed.

Engineer Dammabi also described the province's crop situation for the current year as very good and said: In the current year, through the grace of God almighty, of the province's four principal crops, 600,000 tons of wheat, 140,000 tons of barley, 150,000 tons of onions, and 250,000 tons of potatoes have been produced. In explaining this, he added: Last year, 180,000 hectares of unused land and land used for dry farming were brought under cultivation in the Moghan region with province funds, and with the harvest of 1,800 tons of wheat from these lands the Office of Agriculture obtained an extra 7,000,000 rials from the capital investments in that resource.

Concerning the creation of rural extension centers and the extension of welfare and agricultural services to farmers, he said: "Agricultural service centers will actually be formed for the purpose of providing technical, agriculture, welfare, and credit resources to rural areas. Of 1,600 rural extension centers throughout the country, around 200 will be established in East Azarbaijan covering 4,600 communities. In the current year four of these centers have been established in the municipalities of Ardebil, Maragheh, Sarab, and Moghan. We hope all of these centers will be built during the coming year.

The Secretary General of the East Azarbaijan Department of Agriculture listed the distribution of 250 tons of improved Omid-type seeds, 500 tons of Bazustara seeds, 500 tons of Azar seeds for dry farming, 130 tons of vaccine for fighting black fungus diseases among the province's farmers, the construction of an earth dam in Qazi Kand-e Hashtrud, the implementation of a plan for dry farming to increase the level of production from 600 to 1,200 kilograms per hectare, the construction of 172 kilometers of third class rural roads, and the construction of 10 big bridges as the most important of this office's other activities in the current

year. Concerning the construction of rural roads, he said: "The East Azarbaijan Department of Agriculture's Modernization Office is studying the construction of 452 kilometers of rural roads. Plans have been made recently by provincial officials so that next year the construction of third class rural roads will also be undertaken by the General Department of Roads and Transport, the Reconstruction Crusade, and the Governor General's Technical Office."

At the conclusion of this talk, he listed the continuation of the plan for dry farming; expansion of the breeding of laying hens; the construction of a factory for extracting sulphate of nicotines poison from waterpipe and pipe tobacco; the implementation of a plan for procuring edible poultry for the purpose of self sufficiency, and the preparation of short, medium, and long-term plans for agriculture and animal husbandry in the province by the end of this year as among this office's future plans. He called upon farmers to step up their activities as much as possible and to bring uncultivated lands under cultivation for the sake of attaining self-sufficiency.

He also called upon radio and television officials, especially where television is concerned, to prepare and give greater attention to educational programs in agriculture and animal husbandry for use in the media.

9310

CSO: 4640/132

BRIEFS

NEW OIL WELL IN OPERATION--The technical staff of the National Excavation Company of Iran, with the cooperation of experts of the National Iranian Oil Company, were able to drill a new oil well in the southern oil-rich area of the country. This well is now under ~~exploitation and~~ between 7 to 10,000 barrels of oil per day is produced. This victory of the committed and specialized experts of the National Iranian Oil Company and the National Iranian Excavation Company is a basic step toward reaching self-sufficiency in oil industries and is also considered as a high blow upon the world arrogance, which believed that Iran is not able to follow its industrial plans in oil fields after the foreign experts left this country. [Text] [LD022148 Tehran Radio in English to Europe 1930 GMT 2 Mar 82]

CSO: 4600/308

'AL HAMISHMAR' REPORTS ON NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT

TA261702 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 26 Feb 82 p 3

[Commentary by Mark Gefen: "To Exorcise the Spirit of Self-Destruction"]

[Text] If the U.S. Government has decided to supply weapons to Jordan or to any other Arab country, Israel's protest will not help. Even if it sends to Washington a united delegation composed of all the Knesset factions, from Hadash to Tehiya. Even after the leaders of the U.S. administration--the president and the secretaries of state and defense--tried to "calm" Israel following the leaks by "senior officials," they did not deny the possibility that the United States would indeed supply Jordan with weapons. On the contrary, all three of them commented that this deal was possible and if it is implemented, it will be for the good of the United States and the whole area.

Recently several new tones have been heard in statements by the leaders of the U.S. administration. At least two of them are typical and very significant, and worthy of thought by every Israeli citizen. Caspar Weinberger, in his image of a senior official in his plane, said that the United States would not want to be "Israel's hostage" (it is not important that in the meantime he has tried to deny and muddle the significance of this part of the leak). His intention was clear: the great United States will not be deterred from conducting U.S. policy in the area of the Middle East, too, just because the Begin government might begin a war in Lebanon, or bomb some nuclear reactor, or disrupt the peace process with Egypt. Weinberger's remarks resemble the revolt of a giant who is no longer prepared to put up with the "tickling" of a fly.

Official Washington thinks--and not just from today--that the circle of influence and U.S. policy reliance in our area should be expanded. It is maintaining close ties with Egypt, it wants to strengthen the partnership with Saudi Arabia (and the AWACS deal was approved despite Israel's opposition), and now it is casting its eyes at Jordan again. The supply of weapons to Jordan is the main card (as well as economic aid) that the United States can use in order to attract King Husayn to it.

Attention should also be paid to the (leaked) statement by Alexander Haig about what could occur in Egypt after the IDF withdrawal from Sinai. Egypt will try to turn more toward the Arab world. And although it will not violate the peace agreement with Israel and it will not abandon the United States, the warm and intimate relations will become weaker.

Israel can, perhaps, understand these assessments and thoughts being formed in Washington, but it does not have to accept them. There is no need to mince words here in Israel, to explain to the Israeli reader the danger of supplying U.S. weapons to Jordan or any other Arab country. However, the strength of influence of our opposition is restricted. For example, we have no reply to the following U.S. claim: "And if Jordan receives weapons from the USSR--would you prefer that?" After all, we will not be able to "pressure" the Soviet Union to refrain from supplying such weapons. The Americans say: when Jordan or any other Arab country receives weapons from us, we at least have an influence on their policy, or the ability to deter them from an attack against Israel.

No, we should not be convinced by these arguments because the Arab countries have already fought us in several wars and more than once we came up against U.S. weapons.

Menahem Begin did not succeed in preventing the supply of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia. In return for this, he brought to Israel the greatest achievement in the history of the state of Israel--the "program for strategic cooperation." Does anyone still remember that program which was supposed to turn our country into a giant aircraft carrier, sending off "task forces" to all corners of the world? And, in the meantime, we lost (to our joy, this time') that program, too.

However, Begin has no alternative than to weave great, daring plans. For months now he has been trying--with a certain degree of success--to crystallize a plan for strategic cooperation between...the Likud and the Labor Party. At every opportunity he fights for this using the "national consensus," and he is even prepared to make great sacrifices for this sake. Here, for example, take the Knesset debate on the matter of the possible supply of weapons to Jordan. When Begin succeeded in convincing Shim'on Peres and his colleagues in the alignment to make a common appearance in the Knesset, Begin gave up a "great speech," with attacks against the United States and the alignment. He contented himself with a practical survey of the amounts of weapons in the area. And was that common vote so important, when it really comes down to it? It was worthless. In any case the alignment was going to make a proposal of its own, which was no less sharp than that presented by the "national consensus."

Begin is laying brick upon brick to build a national unity government. It is he who has just proposed a joint "explanatory delegation" to go to the United States, not because we believe in the force of persuasion of explainers from the Likud. No, Begin has several good reasons to pave the road for a national unity government.

In the meantime, the feeling of soberness has increased in the alignment faction, which unanimously rejected Begin's proposal to send a joint delegation to the United States again. But let us not delude ourselves--Begin will continue to erode the alignment and he will find partners in this erosion inside the Labor Party.

The main reason is to destroy the alignment as the alternative force to the Likud. Begin knows that the Likud, it is true, holds the power, but its dependence on every vote of the junior partners forces it into a degrading restraint. He does, it is true, know that the balance of forces in the public remains stable today, too, with the gap between the Likud and the alignment being insignificant. The leader of Herut has come to the conclusion that the chance of stopping the alignment returning to power lies in the fact that the alignment self-destructs.

There is no simpler way to achieve this than to play on the string of national patriotism, to create an "emergency situation" (which will apparently be the case after the Sinai withdrawal) and bring Shim'on Peres, with his colleagues, into a national unity government. The Labor Party, inside such a government, would, for a very long time, stop serving as the alternative for the voter. This is because simple logic says that if patriotism requires a partnership with the Likud, then the greater patriot will certainly vote for the Likud.

Does the Labor Party really not see this process and its results? I assume that many--even those who are now pushing for a "national unity government"--know the dangers very well. But their reasons do not spring from a surplus of belief in their own strength. Some of them really represent what is called "Likud B" and want to break up the partnership with Mapam, which has been weighing heavily on them for a long time. What Moshe Dayan said at one time, when he was a member of Rafi within the Labor Party, that "Menahem Begin was closer to him than Me'ir Ya'ari"--is being said today by people of the type of Nehemkin, Arbeli-Almozlino and their like.

However, if that goal of disbanding the alignment was only the share of those who aspire to a national unity government, the situation might not be so desperate. But they are being joined by many from the Labor Party (perhaps the majority?) who have despaired and lost their belief in the alternative path of the Labor movement, in its ability to break through the barriers between it and broad sections of the working population (especially the oriental community) and in its chances of returning to power in the foreseeable future. All these phenomena are leading to ideological destruction, to compromising with the Likud, with the trend that it is better to lick the plate of power than to sit far from the table laid for a meal.

I assume that there are also some in the Labor Party who think that in a situation in which it has no possibility of returning to power, it would be "better to be inside" and at least try to amend what can be amended in the Likud policy. This too, of course, is a baseless delusion. Members of the Labor Party, when they are "inside," will act as a fig leaf for Begin's

policy. They will have no influence on the general line; they will not move Begin from his desire to annex Judaea and Samaria; they will not restrain him from an adventurous war. They will succeed in only one thing--in destroying the labor movement, in destroying a great camp which, it is true, did not guarantee power for the alignment, but stood up as an equal power to the Likud. All this will crumble into pieces as a result of the "patriotic act" of the establishment of a national unity government.

The Labor Party has been taken over by a "spirit" of self-destruction, a spirit that must be exorcised if we want to save the chance to change the gloomy situation we owe to Begin and his partners in rule. Are the leaders of the Labor Party really not prepared to take a longer breath in order to walk the path of the opposition, which is the genuine patriotic act? Do they no longer believe in the things they themselves said to the voters in the spring of 1981?

The country needs immediate rescuing from the Likud rule. This rescue will not come from a partnership with the force from which we have to rescue the country.

The appeal by Prime Minister Begin to "dear Shim'on," that is, the chairman of the Labor Party, confirms what had been expected for a long time: Begin is trying to destroy the active alternative to the Likud by putting it into the gilded cage of a national unity government. Let us not delude ourselves: even if the answer of the Labor Party is negative this time, the road to the "unity" government has not yet been closed off. Begin will yet try to repeat the exercise when some sort of emergency situation arises, and then the Labor Party will face the real test. From the negative answers I heard this time from several top people in the Labor Party, I am sure if it really will pass this decisive test.

CSO: 4423/115

REPORT ON SHARON'S PLANS FOR TERRITORIES

TA261454 Tel Aviv HATZOFÉ in Hebrew 26 Feb 82 p 3

[Commentary by Yitzhaq Deutsch: "A New Stage in the Development of Judaea and Samaria"]

[Text] He is not accepted by all; he is certainly controversial, but one cannot ignore him altogether. Some see him as desiring expansionism and as a warmonger. There is even a former chief of staff who has said that he causes him insomnia, but there are others who call him "Arik, king of Israel." There is, of course, a middle ground where one sees the great things he did and his captivating, attractive ideas, as well as the fact that at times the man needs to be restrained and needs to have the brakes put on him. This can still not mar his vision, daring and performance.

Altering the map of Eretz Yisra'el through a wide-scale settlement enterprise in Judaea and Samaria should be largely--perhaps even greatly--attributed to Ari'el Sharon. Not only in terms of the number of settlements and their population, but also in terms of having the sweeping vision regarding the location of the settlements and the roads that have to be paved to lead there--which created the new, current situation in Judaea and Samaria.

We are now on the brink of stage two. Arik is now using the establishment under him to carry it out. Today there is rural and urban settlement activity and there are population centers, but there is still no firm, stable economic basis for these settlements. Most of the settlers depend for their livelihood on employment inside the green line. This dependence certainly weakens the stability of the settlement drive.

Now the defense minister has launched another initiative: To spread industrial plants throughout Judaea and Samaria, with the defense industry at its center. It is now experiencing a new momentum with the decision to manufacture the Lavi, and with the development of a new missile boat for the navy and a new model of the Merkava tank. At the same time, however, there is an intention of spreading this industry--like the entire industrial deployment--in Judaea and Samaria. This time, Ari'el Sharon has placed this challenge not before a handful of settlers or a few entrepreneurs, but before the entire industrial network in Israel. The message Sharon passed on is that the political future of parts of western Eretz Yisra'el would depend on our deploying in those regions.

Some 5 years ago, then Agriculture Minister Ari'el Sharon summoned a group of officials from various ministries to discuss his plan for Judaea and Samaria. He stuck a map on the wall and pinned some colored thumbtacks to it, each representing a settlement to be established there. He outlined the roads that will convert our hold over the area into fact. The participants in the meeting thought he was half-crazed. When he concluded his term as agriculture minister, the members of that group could only learn that this plan of his was fully realized.

One can sense that upon launching into stage two, we will witness a similar process. Ari'el Sharon, currently the defense minister, has made it clear that his present policy is aimed at transferring the center of gravity of the development of the infrastructure in Israel into the entire expanse of Israel. In the next decade, as well as in the following one, the main investments will be channeled to developing a transportation infrastructure. the supply of water. energy and the like in the Galilee. Samaria. Judaea and the Negev. Plants moving to those areas will enjoy special aid from the word go.

At this stage it is impossible to be specific how many plants will be moved to those areas or how much money will be invested in them. But one can definitely estimate that this has given a great push to industrialization in those areas. In most populated areas of the country there is a problem of land shortage. Plants with serious development prospects prefer to secure the appropriate land reserves, since it is inconvenient to move a plant at a later stage. Regarding Samaria, the distance from the center of the country is small, and in all those areas the plants there enjoy a preferred status. The fact that a broad, modern infrastructure is being developed helps those plants, so that they enjoy a whole host of advantages compared with their counterparts in the center of the country.

The transfer of those plants to the above-mentioned areas will allow the local settlements to base themselves economically and in terms of employment. The establishment of plants might serve to attract vast waves of manpower.

From all these aspects one should regard the defense minister's announcement as an important new milestone in digging in Judaea and Samaria. Following the stage one achievements in the actual settling in those regions, one can already sense the beginnings of stage two. Thus Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon can be seen as the big "bulldozer." In the day-to-day actions, getting a firmer hold of Eretz Yisra'el is being done.

CSO: 4423/115

'DAVAR' ON POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENT WITH JORDAN

TA261427 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 26 Feb 82 p 14

[Commentary by Hagay Eshed: "An Interim Arrangement With Jordan"]

[Text] Like the wave of analysis and interpretation--largely negative--on the possibility of establishing a national unity government, Prime Minister Menahem Begin's approach to Labor Party Chairman Shim'on Peres on this issue actually put the cart before the horse. In no way could this materialize before some essential prior conditions are created, both in Israel's foreign policy and in its domestic affairs. These do not exist right now, nor can they come into being in one day--the day after tomorrow at the earliest, perhaps toward the "post-April" period. Even though this is not so far away, there is a great chasm, a dangerous minefield that separates us from the "post-April" period: the opposition to the withdrawal from the Sinai; the danger of war across the Lebanese border and U.S. pressure on a "preemptive reaction" to restrain Israeli militarily and soften it politically. Many things could still happen before the "post-April" period and it is not at all clear what bridges could be built across the canyon separating it from the shores across it.

It is necessary to build external bridges to improve the relations with the United States, to curb its pressures as an arms dealer dangerous to our well-being, to resume the peace process, to pull the negotiating cart from the mud in which it is stuck, to find another partner to substantial negotiations--which could be one of three; or two of three together--Jordan, the representatives of the Judaea and Samaria residents and a "moderate PLO," if it exists or if anyone can bring any of these to the negotiating table."

It is necessary to erect internal bridges--linked to the external ones and leading to them. By this I mean that it is essential for the resumption of the external negotiations to have internal agreement within the government (the incumbent or the next one, narrow or wide) over the desired partner to the resumption of the negotiations and on the possible goal desired from these negotiations that should be agreed upon. The prerequisite of and only justification for the very need for a national unity government is in joining together these internal and external bridges. The Alignment has a political dowry which, as far as it is concerned, is something one would under no

circumstances relinquish for the sake of any "coalition match"--it is negotiations with Jordan on a mutual agreement (and we will immediately specify what kind of agreement is possible and desirable) in order to advance toward peace, or at least to ward off the danger of war along the eastern front in addition to the southern one. If the Likud government wants to adopt the Alignment's "Jordanian dowry," the wedding will take place. If not, there will not be anything to discuss, to use a common turn of phrase.

All those members of the press and from the political world who engage in reacting and analyzing national unity are getting all excited about nothing. Some of my colleagues will have to pardon me if I say that many of their reactions and interpretations appear to me to be "petty vendors' haggling" over personal, partisan and coalition horse-trading. If there is no genuine early agreement on the resumption of the peace process and its extension to the eastern front as well, there will be no national unity government; and if there is such agreement, what is the point of those who argue against such a government now? All of them, by and large, desire additional real progress toward the goal of peace and they will not station obstacles before a national unity government that would allow for yet another big leap toward this goal.

The incumbent Likud government will try to progress toward peace by reaching an autonomy agreement according to its conditions. If it succeeds, it will anyway not want a wide government, nor will one be necessary; but if it fails and there is no autonomy agreement, Israel "after April" will remain deprived of any sort of political tool against a stifling siege, against huge U.S. arms deals with all our neighbors--Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and perhaps even Iraq. How will we curb this danger, time after time, wave after wave? Only by a unified vote in the Knesset? The only conceivable way is to demand that the United States condition the supply of arms to Jordan on Jordanian readiness to conduct negotiations with Israel. Not according to the unacceptable dictate of a total withdrawal on the eastern front as well, including from East Jerusalem, following the "sanctioned" Egyptian precedence of totally withdrawing from every grain of "holy" sand along the Elat (Tabah) coast.

It may very well be that Jordan will refuse to talk to us, but this is better than if we turn down an offer to converse with it. It is better to have the United States pressure Jordan to talk to Israel than to have it pressure Israel to talk to the PLO. The question, then, is what can be negotiated with Jordan now, what should be discussed, and what it is worth while to discuss. The Camp David accords do not make it a necessity to conduct negotiations with Jordan at the present stage, but only at the next stage--the one following the establishment of the autonomy, 3 years after it begins to function. It will be necessary to conduct negotiations on the future of the autonomy as well as on the (partially parallel) question of a peace agreement with Jordan--including the border problem. Meanwhile, for the present, Egypt is the only Arab partner to the autonomy negotiations. If an autonomy agreement is reached with it (and right now it appears to be a very big "if") the question will be whether the representatives of the local

inhabitants would accept the conditions in this agreement or if they would join the negotiations on it at the last stage. This too seems pretty debatable. This is the description of the current "hurdle," the "Egyptian hurdle" which the autonomy talks cannot jump over. The crucial question (and it is the one on which the answer to whether or not a national unity government would actually be established depends almost exclusively, as we said before) is whether the government could or would want to overcome the "Egyptian obstacle" and try to substitute the autonomy negotiations partners--to have Jordan instead of Egypt. In such a case, several possible scenarios could emerge that will have to be examined jointly and severely. It will be possible to open negotiations with the representatives of Jordan or with representatives of the inhabitants of the territories who will be appointed through Jordan or at its recommendation and/or together with the representatives of the local inhabitants who will be recommended or authorized by the "moderate PLO," if such a thing exists, in an inconspicuous manner, with a covert Israeli agreement, with Jordan (and not Egypt) occupying the head of the Arab table for the sake of conducting autonomy negotiations.

If Jordan sits at the head of the table, these will automatically be negotiations on an agreement that would expand and solidify the arrangement on "open bridges" which is the de facto interim arrangement (although not in the full legal sense of the term) between Israel and Jordan. If Jordan also sits at the head of the table during the negotiations as well as when the agreement is discussed, this will naturally also constitute a subtle yet deeply-rooted brake against the danger of the autonomy becoming an independent Palestinian state. On the other hand, in any case, any autonomy agreement will have to include an arrangement for land and water as well as a consolidation of the map of settlements and military deployment. It will be easier to reach an interim agreement of these issues with Jordan than with an elected Palestinian entity. Even the problem of Jerusalem is easier to handle with Jordan--whose capital is Amman, and who will wish to be independent. [as published]

Then why an interim arrangement and not peace? Because Jordan will not be able to give up, in a peace agreement, the "sanctified" Egyptian precedent of Israel withdrawing from the last inch, and will not even be able to negotiate this. That is why an interim arrangement with Jordan is topical. This is the heart of the matter of the joint opportunity, all the parts of which are interlinked and mutually dependent. The chance exists for an advancement toward peace on the eastern front as well; to remove the "Egyptian hurdle" from the way to negotiating an autonomy agreement, to enable the United States to deepen and strengthen its hold on Jordan and Saudi Arabia on the basis of progress toward peace and concern for Israel's safety rather than on the basis of increasing the danger of war along the eastern front, too, by adventurist and "dirty" arms deals. And the opportunity exists to strengthen Jordan's influence in the territories in the face of that of the "rejectionist front" and the extremist PLO and, if possible, to draw the moderates in it into the process (this will be found out only through negotiations with Jordan, in which case it will be possible to determine if the moderates join it or not). Simultaneous

with all these, there is the chance of establishing a national unity government based theoretically and in practice on a political working plan for making "a great leap" forward toward peace by making interim arrangements with Jordan.

This compound goal should be offered to any future government by the alignment, at its own initiative. If the Likud accepts the offer, there will be need and justification to establish a national unity government. If not, there will not be one. This ball of "the Jordanian opening" toward the resumption of the peace process can and must be tossed back to Menahem Begin's court.

CSO: 4423/115

BRIEFS

STATE BUDGETS APPROVED--Last night, with a 55-vote majority of the coalition, the Knesset passed to the finance committee next year's state budget of 475 billion shekels, as well as the supplementary budget of 41 billion shekels, to be prepared for the second and third readings. The above-mentioned budgets were opposed by 44 votes from the opposition. [Text] [TA030946 Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 3 Mar 82 p 1]

RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS POST--The post of the religious affairs deputy minister is to stay open following Rabbi Druckman's resignation. It has been agreed between the prime minister and NRP cabinet members not to replace Druckman in order to facilitate Rabbi Druckman's return to the post after the conclusion of the withdrawal from Sinai. Even though there is no real intention at present to again offer Druckman the post of religious affairs deputy minister, the prime minister and the NRP ministers want to ensure that Druckman gets every chance not to leave the coalition. It is assumed that after the withdrawal from Sinai is concluded, it will be easier for Rabbi Druckman to support the government again. [Text] [TA031424 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Mar 82 p 2]

NEGEV AIRFIELDS--The two new airfields being constructed in the Negev will be completed on time, by the final evacuation of Sinai in April, and the transfer last week of the air force flight force to these airfields from those to be evacuated in Sinai continued. This was reported on 26 February by Brig Gen Moshe Bertov, the head of the airfields administration who is supervising the new airfields. Moshe Bertov said that by the final evacuation on 25 April, about 85 percent of the installations in the new airfields will be completed and there will be a first operational capability. As for the financial expenses of constructing the new airfields, the estimated budget will be overspent by about 6 percent. We are a poor country and so we have had to fight over every penny; we felt a commitment to this issue and we fought against any waste. According to him, the potential of the new airfields meets the air force's needs for the 1990's. These airfields are a replacement for the fields to be evacuated in Sinai. However, we paid a certain price for peace. For example, the 'Etzyoni field was not in artillery range on both

sides of the border, as the current airfields will be. The head of the airfields administration also reported that the people constructing the airfields will take out of the country a total of \$250 million, while only \$170 million was originally mentioned. [Text] [TA281026 Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 28 Feb 82 p 1]

WEST BANK TRADE UNION--The military government is not permitting trade unions in Judaea and Samaria to open branches in villages without its permission. Today the military government closed the branch of the trade union in Kafr 'Ayn in the Ramallah subdistrict and our correspondent has learned that it is going to close another branch in the village of Idnah in the Beron subdistrict. Our correspondent points out that 1 year ago the military government closed the branch of the trade unions in Batir Village, but it permitted its reopening after intervention by the International Labor Organization. The international organization drew the attention of the military government to the fact that there is nothing in the law that forbids an approved union to open branches in villages. [Text] [TA272039 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2000 GMT 27 Feb 82]

FLIGHT UNITS TO NEGEV--Flight units have already been transferred to the Negev airfields at Ramon and 'Uvda. The head of the airfields administration in the Negev, Brig Gen Moshe Bartov, has said that it is clear that the new fields are a successful substitute for the previous ones, even though they are within range of artillery from both sides of the border. Brigadier General Bartov disclosed that the construction of the airfields will be completed within a year. [Text] [TA261717 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 26 Feb 82]

YAMIT DISTRICT BEDOUIN--The Yamit District bedouin have during the last few days been feverishly preparing for the transfer of the area to Egypt in 40 days. Along the road from Yamit down to Ne'ot Sinai, a desolate area only a short time ago, are growing from day to day new stone houses, shacks, and thousands of dunams of land is being prepared for cultivation. The bedouin are seeking to establish faits accomplis in the field, and when the Egyptian rule comes here after the evacuation, they will be able to claim tenure, without having to resort to the complex procedures of purchasing land and requesting building permits. Trucks loaded with dozens of refrigerators, stoves, electrical appliances and building material are reaching the area day by day. The Bedouin are buying "bargains" in Israel, in order to trade in them with considerable profit after the handover. [Text] [TA261033 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 26 Feb 82 p 4]

W. BANK DIFFICULTIES--Nabulus Mayor Bassam Ash-Shak'ah said over the weekend that the military government was not permitting the municipality to start building a public housing project in an area that belongs to the city. Military government sources said yesterday that it is impossible to start building there without receiving a license from the persons in the civilian administration authorized to approve building plans. The heads of the rural

councils surrounding Tulkarm, who conferred with the heads of the regional civilian administration yesterday, have complained that because they have declined cooperation with members of the "area villages leagues" in the vicinity, funds slated for them in the civilian administration have been frozen. The citrus growers have also complained about having encountered difficulties in exporting their produce for similar reasons. The West Bank Teachers Union yesterday issued an announcement stating that the civilian administration has recently fired 11 teachers who hold masters' degrees in science for having been members of the teachers union last year. [sentence as published] ITIM Report: The Ramallah military government has ordered the closure of the trade union branch recently established in Kafr 'Ayn near Ramallah. It has been learned that the tendency is to also close other such branches that have been opened in the villages without the proper permits. A year ago a branch of the trade unions closed in the village of Batin, but was subsequently reopened at the intervention of the International Labor Organization. That organization claimed that there was no need to have permits to open trade union offices. [Text] [TA011347 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 1 Mar 82 p 3]

OFFICIAL TO S. LEBANON--At the end of last week deputy labor and welfare minister Ben-Ziyon Rubin visited three villages in southern Lebanon and met with instructors at vocational training centers in the area. Knesset member Rubin was a guest of the christian enclave's authorities. He told his hosts Israel was willing to help southern Lebanon and assist in the areas of labor and professional training, out of respect for the independence of southern Lebanon. The deputy minister also met with female laborers from the region who work in Israel. Some 800 men and women from southern Lebanon are employed in Israel's northern settlements, most of whom work in tailor shops or do forestry work for the Jewish National Fund. In the course of the visit, the deputy labor minister contributed, in the name of his ministry, a number of sewing machines and car engines to the training centers, for studying purposes. [Text] [TA281053 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 28 Feb 82]

HEBRON LOCAL COUNCIL--The 120 Jewish residents of some houses in old Hebron have a separate local council which receives financial allocations and instructions from the Interior Ministry, as well as aid from the defense and the housing ministries. Our correspondent, Shlomo Raz, reports that a three-member committee has been established there--with two representatives of the civilian administration and one representative of the inhabitants--to deal with electricity, water, sewage and education affairs pertaining to that group of inhabitants. [Text] [TA020542 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 2 Mar 82]

NAHAL SETTLEMENT--"Nahal Nimrod" is the name of the new Nahal settlement recently established between the Druze villages of Mas'adah and Majdal Shams in the northern Golan Heights. The new settlement is located opposite the Qla'at Nimrod fortress and is manned by a Nahal nucleus from kibbutz 'Ein Zivan. [Menahem Horovitz] [Text] [TA031426 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Mar 82 p 8]

COPTIC LAND--The supreme court has issued an interim injunction against the civilian administration of Judaea and Samaria over a land dispute with the coptic church. The land was taken over by the military government a few years ago. When church representatives won a ruling in Ramallah's district court to give it back, the army refused to obey. In their appeal to the supreme court, the church representatives claimed that the army's behavior was part of an overall Israeli policy to get property belonging to the coptic church. The civilian administration which has since replaced the military government will now have to show the court why the land should not be returned to the copts. [Text] [TA020608 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 2 Mar 82]

GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENTS--The cabinet yesterday appointed Uri'el Lynn as director-general of the Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure commencing on March 15. Lynn replaces David Haqo'ell. Lynn is a member of the Liberal Party's younger guard who has served as director of the state revenues administration for several years. Energy Minister Yitzhaq Berman is a liberal. In order to place a Herut man in a key job in the civil service commission, the cabinet also agreed to create a new post: deputy civil service commissioner. Avraham Natan, former town clerk on Lod and a veteran Herut functionary, was named to fill the new post. The creation of the position of "deputy" by Finance Minister Yoram Aridor enabled the government to make the appointment without issuing a public tender, as would have been required by law for an "assistant" commissioner. [Text] [TA010948 Jerusalem POST in English 1 Mar 82 p 3]

CSO: 4400/152

INFORMATION MINISTER EXPLAINS SUPPORT FOR IRAQ

LD060814 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 0740 GMT 6 Mar 82

[Text] Kuwait, 6 Mar (KUNA)--Jordanian Information Minister 'Adnan Abu 'Awdah, in a statement published here today, defended the attitude of Iraq vis-a-vis the war against Iran. He said that his country regards itself as an ally of Iraq standing with it against any Arab attitude that does not support Iraq in its conflict with Iran.

In a statement to Kuwaiti AS-SIYASAH, he said that Jordan, which considers itself as a party in the fighting, is against the attitude of Syria toward the Iraqi-Iranian war; he described Syria's attitude as a departure from the joint Arab defense pact which is based on the unity of the Arab nation. He said: "We have entered this war as volunteers 17 months after the beginning of the war, but throughout those 17 months and until this moment we, with all others, have always called for the ending of this war. We say, while we are sending volunteers to stand by Iraq, that the war should stop and that Iran should listen to the voice of logic and accept the ending of the war."

He also said that his country regarded its siding with Iraq as an expression of commitment and a gesture of loyalty to a country which for over 35 years has played the role of military backup for Jordan. He pointed out that some of the Yarmuk forces which Jordan promised to send to Iraq have actually arrived in Baghdad and the rest are undergoing training and will be ready in a few weeks' time. He expressed hope that the war will end as soon as possible and that the two combatants will one day sit together to reach a peaceful settlement acceptable to both sides and guaranteeing the rights of both of them so that this will be a starting point for goodneighborly relations between Iran and its Arab neighbors.

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